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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHARLES THOMAS DUFFY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7294 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for personal injuries brought under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 
51 et seq.), which will be sometimes hereinafter referred to 
as the F. E. L. A. (R. 1-6). For purposes of convenience 
the respondent, Charles Thomas Duffy, will hereinafter be 
referred to as the plaintiff. The appellant, Union Pacific 
Railroad <Company, will hereinafter be referred to as the 
defendant. 
Plaintiff, Charles Thomas Duffy, was injured on the 
29th day of January, 1947 (R. 117). He was, and for 28 
years prior thereto had been, an employe of the defendant, 
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Union Pacific Railroad Company (R. 90). On the 11th day 
of October, 1946, Duffy was operated on by Dr. Rees 
Anderson of Salt Lake City for a gallbladder condition (R. 
175). This particular operation was not in any way con-
nected with Duffy's employment; and no claim was made by 
Duffy of any liability on the part of the railroad company 
with reference thereto (R. 1 to 6 inclusive, 134). On 
November 20, 1946 Duffy was released for work by Dr. 
Anderson after having convalesced from the gallbladder 
operation (R. 10f7, 108, 180). At the time of the operation 
for the gallbladder trouble an incision had necessarily been 
made into Duffy's abdomen and this incision had healed 
sufficiently to permit Duffy's return to work by the 20th 
of November, 1946, in the opinion of Dr. Anderson who had 
performed the operation (R. 185, 186). 
During the remainder of 1946 and the month of January, 
1947 Duffy worked regularly as a brakeman in passenger 
service (R. 108). Until the day of the accident, January 
29, 1947, Duffy had handled his regular shifts with no 
particular trouble (R. 108). On the day of the accident 
Duffy was working as a rear end brakeman traveling from 
Caliente, Nevada, to Salt Lake City, Utah, on train No. 
44, which was a mail and express train (R. 92). This train 
necessarily had to travel through the railroad company's 
yards at Milford, Utah. The main line track upon which 
the train was traveling was a single track, that is, said 
track was used by trains traveling both east and west (R. 
93). At Milford, Utah, the railroad company maintained 
a yard in which a track known as No. 1 track ran generally 
parallel with the main line and immediately south thereof, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
railroad directions (R. 95). It was the custom for many 
trains traveling through this yard to leave the main line 
and travel along track No. 1 through the Milford yards in 
order to allow other trains proceeding in the opposite direc-
tion to pass. The movement is and was made from the 
main line to track No. 1, or vice versa, over what is known 
as a crossover track at the west end of the Milford yards (R. 
95, 96, 98) . Between the main line and this crossover 
track there was a switch which allowed the tracks to be so 
aligned that a train could either proceed easterly directly 
along the main line or could be turned into the crossover. 
Likewise, at the intersection of the crossover track and 
track No. 1 was another switch which could be so operated 
that trains could proceed straight along track No. 1 or could 
be routed on or off the crossover (R. 95, 96). These switches 
in addition to serving the function of moving the rails to 
permit trains to travel as desired also operated block signals 
on the main line which controlled the movement of all trains 
as follows: Unless both switches were aligned in such a 
manner as to allow through traffic on the main line and also 
on No. 1 track, so that in effect the crossover track was 
disconnected at both ends, red block signals would be dis-
played on the main line stopping all trains from proceeding 
along the same (R. 140). 
'These switches were both what are known as low 
ground throw switches, sometimes referred to as hub 
switches. They were operated by a lever slightly shorter 
than a yardstick in a manner hereafter to be described (R. 
~- 146). These switches were two of the most important 
~' switches in the yard and were used many times each day 
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(R. 141, 143). Because of the necessity of proper opera-
tion of the block signals and also in order to make possible 
the movement of trains through the Milford yards, it was 
the duty of the head end brakeman on eastbound trains 
taking the crossover and No. 1 track through the Milford 
yards to align both switches so that the train could proceed 
eastward over the crossover onto the No.1 track and thence 
eastward through the Milford yards (R. 95, 96). The train 
would therefore be stopped immediately west of the first 
switch and the head end brakeman would align both switches 
in a suitable manner. Thereafter the train would pull 
through the crossover until the rear end of the train had 
passed the s~econd switch connecting the c~rossover to 
the No. 1 track; and it would then be the duty of the rear 
end brakeman to realign the switches for through traffic 
both on the main line and on No. 1 track ( R. 95, 96, 97). 
This was the standard position of the switches and the 
condition in which they were always left when not being 
specifically used because of the necessity of keeping the 
block signal system open for traffic (R. 139, 140). On the 
day of the accident when train No. 44 arrived at Milford, 
eastbound, the head end brakeman, whose name was Mc-
Intosh, threw both switches so that the train could proceed 
over the crossover and eastward on No. 1 track. This was 
less than five minutes before the accident (R. 149, 150). 
Thereafter train No. 44 proceeded through both switches 
onto No. 1 track and Duffy alighted from the rear end to 
discharge his duty as a rear end brakeman by realigning 
both switches (R. 109). Duffy experienced no particular 
difficulty in realigning the switch between the main line 
and the crossover track (R. 109), but while throwing the 
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switch connecting the crossover track with No. 1 track he 
sustained an incisional hernia in the incision which had been 
theretofore made in connection with the gallbladder opera-
tion (R. 109, 113, 126, 180). 
The manner in which this type of switch is thrown 
customarily and in which Duffy threw the switch on the 
day of the accident, insofar as the mechanical operation of 
the switch is concerned, was described to the jury by using 
a ruler and demonstrating to the jury (R. 116). If a yard-
stick be laid on the floor in an easterly and westerly direc-
tion and it be considered that the west end of the yard-
stick is a hub, then the operation of the switch is accomp-
lished by grasping the east end of the yardstick, lifting up 
until the same reaches a vertical position, and then pushing 
downward until what had theretofore been the east end of 
the yardstick is now the west end (R. 116, 145, 146). Thus 
the lever which operates the switch moved through a 180° 
arc to complete the movement. This lever is fastened by a 
locking mechanism at each extreme of the movement in 
such a manner as to require unfastening with a key before 
the lever may be thrown (R. 146). Ordinarily the switch is 
thrown by the use of the switchman's hands, but if the same 
is tight the feet are used to assist in pushing the lever back 
to a horizontal position (R. 241, 270, 271). Duffy testi-
fied that this particular switch was exceptionally hard 
to throw and that in order to successfully accomplish the 
operation he raised the switch to a vertical position, put 
one hand on the switch lever, and braced the other hand 
:. against a lamp post with a signal light on it which was 
:r in the immediate vicinity and completed the throwing of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the switch by pushing out from his body with both hands 
(R. 117). Since we do not intend upon this appeal toques-
tion the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to justify sub-
mission of this case to a jury, there is no purpose to be served 
by detailing any further the difficulties which Duffy en-
countered in throwing the switch nor his evidence as to 
its difficulty of operation. 
After Duffy arrived at Salt Lake City upon completion 
of the trip he again went to Dr. Rees Anderson who dis-
covered the incisional hernia ( R. 125, 126) . For reasons 
which are in conflict in the evidence Duffy was not operated 
on immediately but was permitted to return to work as a 
switchman until February 28, 1947 (R. 131). On the 3rd 
of March, 1947 Duffy entered a hospital in Salt Lake 
City and on the 4th of March, 1947 Duffy was operated on 
for the correction of the incisional hernia (R. 136, 137). On 
June 16, 1947 Duffy returned to his work (R. 137). It was 
stipulated by the parties that the total loss of wages 
sustained by Duffy as a result of this accident was $1,300.00 
(R. 132, 133). The testimony with reference to Duffy's 
physical condition after the accident is unmistakably clear 
to the effect that by the time of trial and even long prior 
thereto Duffy had made a complete recovery (R. 191). 
Certainly the record contains absolutely no evidence of any 
permanent injury sustained by Duffy in this accident or 
even any testimony that the effects of the injury had not 
completely disappeared by June 16, 1947 when Duffy re-
turned to work (R. 191). All the evidence with reference 
to pain and suffering sustained by Duffy will be herein-
after set forth: 
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A. Well, I had a sharp pain in my stomach and 
burning sensation which felt like warm water run-
ning over my stomach, a stinging sensation. (R. 113) 
* * * 
Q. Well, I don't think you quite understand 
my question. What can you say about the presence 
or absence of pain? 
A. Oh, I told him about the pain I had had, 
still had it. 
Q. Well, describe that pain to the jury? 
A. \Vell, after throwing this switch, I had 
severe pain right in the pit of my stomach here, and, 
as I said before, felt like there was some water 
running out, maybe I had broken open. 
After I had went on the train, went in the dressing 
room, opened up my shirt, looked, it was all right, 
only red, little bit red. 
Q. That night, when you were at home, what 
can you say with respect to the presence or absence 
of pain? 
A. Night when I got home I still had the pain, 
but the area red was larger. 
Q. Were you able to sleep that night? 
A. Not very well ; I rolled around quite a bit, 
quite painful; felt stiff like. 
Q. Did you do anything for the pain? 
A. No, I couldn't. I didn't get in Salt Lake 
City until sometime around seven-thirty. (R. 126) 
* * * 
Q. And from the time that you saw the doctor 
until you went to the hospital for the operation 
what can you say about the presence or absence of 
pain? 
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A. Well, I had pain now and then; more of a 
trial, you know, sometimes get a sharp pain. 
Q. Could you stoop down? 
A. If I stooped down I seemed like something 
was moving up, like that. 
Q. How about evenings, and your ability to 
sleep? 
A. I slept fairly well about a week afterward. 
(R. 128) 
* * * 
Q. Were you conscious or unconscious when 
the operation was performed? 
A. Well, I was conscious when he started, but 
I don't remember it. I remember them starting to 
cut, just feel like something scraping. (R. 12'9) 
* * * 
Q. And what can you say with respect to the 
presence or absence of pain during that fourteen 
days? 
A. Well, there was quite a burning, sharp, 
shooting pain all the time. (R. 130) 
* * * 
Q. After you were at home, and during this 
period, what can you say about the pain? 
A. Pain? Yes, I had pain when I came home, 
but I had some pills, morphine tablets they would 
give me in the hospital, when I left. (R. 130) 
Dr. Rees Anderson testified with reference to the matter 
of pain and suffering as follows : 
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Q. And did he make some complaint of pain, 
to you, at that time when he came to see you? 
A. I will have to refer to the record. Yes, he 
did complain of pain. 
Q. And to what would you attribute his pain 
after, at that time? 
A. I felt that the pain that he complained of 
was probably due to· the fact that we had actually 
sutured the fascia in an imbricated or underlying 
fascia, this is bringing it together in a tight or 
unnatural condition. This was a safeguard to allow 
us two or three rows of suture material when re-
paired. I attribute to the, that technical procedure 
for the operation, the subsequent pain. 
Q. And the pain, then, I understand, resulted 
from the fact that the man's stomach was drawn 
little tighter than in a normal-than it was normally, 
and had been, and it took some time for the body 
to adjust to it; is that correct? 
A. That is correct, with the exception it was 
the abdominal wall, not the stomach. 
Q. Abdominal wall. And wouldn't you expect 
that after the adjustment was made, and became 
used to it, for that pain to go away? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know of any other thing that might 
cause him pain, as a result of that operation-! mean 
up to, say, six months after the operation? 
A. I suppose there is some pain after any oper-
ation when the skin and tissues are cut through, 
until the healing ocurs, but, in my opinion, that was 
the major cause of his pain. (R. 189, 190) 
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It also appears from Dr. Anderson's testimony that the 
operation to repair the incisional hernia was a major opera-
tion in the same sense that all operations are considered 
serious (R. 183, 184, 185), but the gallbladder operation 
undergone by Duffy in the fall of 1946 was a far more 
serious operation than the repair of the incisional hernia 
(R. 184). In fact, it is apparent from the description given 
by Dr. Anderson as to the repair of the incisional hernia 
that the operation consisted simply of resewing the in-
cision theretofore made in the gallbladder operation in a 
more secure manner (R. 193, 194). 
The case was tried to a jury upon this evidence and 
upon plaintiff's complaint praying for $12,500.00 damages; 
and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for 
$12,,500.00, less $3,500.00 for contributory negligence, a net 
verdict of $9,000.00 (R. 21). This verdict was not unani-
mous (R. 322). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
the· defendant was an insurer of the safety of its employes 
while on duty, as it did in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph of instruction No.3 (R. 45, 46). 
2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury in the 
manner contained in the second paragraph of Instruction No. 
9 (R. 50). 
3. .The. trial court erred in instructing the jury in the 
manner contained in the first paragraph of the Court's 
Instruction No. 11 (R. 51). 
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4. The trial court erred in permitting and inviting the 
jury to award damages to the plaintiff for future pain and 
suffering and for .future loss of bodily function, since there 
was no evidence in the record to justify the submission of 
such elements of damage to the jury for consideration. (See 
Instruction No. 16, lines 10, 11, 18 and 20; R. 55.) 
5. The trial court erred in failing· and refusing to in-
struct the jury as requested by the defendant in its Re-
quested Instruction No.9 (R. 33). 
6. The trial court erred in failing and refusing to in-
struct the jury as requested by the defendant in its Re-
quested Instruction No. 10 (R. 34). 
7. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial for the reason that the verdict in this action 
awards to the plaintiff excessive damages, given under the 
influence of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury 
(R. 63, 71). 
8. The trial court erred in failing and refusing to grant 
to the defendant a new trial because of the accumulation 
of errors mentioned in the foregoing assignments of error, 
all duly excepted to by the defendant (R. 71). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS AN IN-
SURER OF THE SAFETY OF ITS EMPLOYES WHILE 
ON DUTY. 
In Instruction No. 3 the trial court advised the jury 
that the defendant was an insurer of the safety of its em-
ployes while on duty in the following language: 
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"The statute upon which this action is based is 
the Federal Employers Liability Act and said Act 
provides every common carrier by railroad while 
engaging in commerce between any of the several 
states shall be liable in damages to any person suf-
fering injury while he is employed by such carrier 
in such commerce, and for such injury resulting in 
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the 
employees of such carrier in its appliances, machin-
ery, or other equipment." (R. 45, 46). 
The basic premise for appellant's argument that the 
above instruction constitutes error is our contention that 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act requires proof of 
negligence on the part of the railroad company in order to 
justify recovery by an injured employe. Liability under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act is still based on negli-
gence. 
"The act does not make the employer the insurer 
of the safety of his employes while they are on duty. 
The basis of his liability in his negligence, not the 
·fact that injuries occurred." Ellis v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 329 U. S. 649, 91 L. Ed. 572, 67 Sup. 
Ct. 598. 
"f_iability arises from negligence, not from 
injury, under this act." Brady v. Southern Railway 
Co., 320 U.S. 4716, 88 L. Ed. 239, 64 Sup. Ct. 232. 
"There are some who think that recent decisions 
of this Court which have required submission of 
negligence questions to a jury make, 'for all prac-
tical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its employees.' 
See individual opinion of Judge Major, Griswold v. 
Gardner, 155 F. (2d) 333, 334. * * * This as-
sumption, that railroads are made insurers where 
the issue of negligence is left to the jury, is inad-
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missible. It rests on another assumption, this one 
unarticulated, that juries will invariably decide 
negligence questions against railroads." Wilkerson 
v. McCarthy & Swan, Trustees of the Denver & Rio 
Grande Weste1-n Railroad Company, 336 U.S. 53. 
Even if the implications of Mt. Justice Jackson's dis-
senting opinion in the ll'"ilkerson case, supra, to the effect 
that a jury question is presented in all F'ederal Employers' 
Liability cases, are justified, nevertheless the concept of 
negligence as a basis for liability remains a jury question 
and should be presented to the jury with proper instruc-
tions. This principle was clearly violated by the court's 
Instruction No. 3. The italicized portion of the quoted 
instruction specifically informs the jury that the employing 
railroad shall be liable in damages to any person suffering 
injury while he is employed by such carrier in interstate 
commerce. This portion of the instruction can only be 
understood to mean that the defendant was an insurer of 
the safety of Duffy and its other employes while on duty. 
Unless this portion of the instruction is qualified or re-
stricted by the remaining portions of the instruction, then 
certainly error was committed by the trial court. This must 
be so because even the most liberal decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States recognize the right of the de-
fendant to trial by jury properly instructed that the basis 
of the railroad's liability is negligence. See the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Wilkerson case, 
supra: 
"Trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion of the United States and of the several States 
presupposes a jury under proper guidance of a dis-
interested and competent trial judge." 
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It is plainly evident that the italicized portion of the 
instruction quoted above is in direct conflict with the 
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States con-
struing the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We respect-
fully submit that the remaining portion of said instruction 
reading as follows: ", and for such injury resulting in 
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the em-
ployees of such carrier in its appliances, machinery, or 
other equipment," does not constitute such a qualification 
of the italicized portion of said instruction as to rectify 
the giving thereof by the trial court. The qualification, if 
such it be, is in our estimation so unintelligible as to be an 
ineffective restriction on the first part of the instruction, 
even if it were intended by the trial court as a restriction 
of any sort. It does not appear that the last phraseology of 
the quoted instruction would be intelligible to a trained 
lawyer, much less to a lay jury. The last words of the 
instruction do not seem to have any meaning as applied to 
the previous portions thereof and, in fact, appear as an 
interjection of the court in nowise connected with the con-
text of the previous portions of the instruction; but if there 
be any intelligent interpretation of the last portion of the 
quoted instruction, certainly such interpretation will not 
be that any restriction is intended as to the previous state--
ments contained therein. The last portion of the instruction 
does not even purport to he a qualification of the italicized 
phraseology but is clearly an addition thereto. The word 
"and" is not restrictive in nature but conjunctive, and if the 
jury were able to glean any meaning from the abortive at-
tempt to paraphrase the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
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then the only reasonable assumption is that the jury would 
have interpreted the same as stating two bases of liability 
under the act: (a) injury to an employe while on duty; (b) 
injury caused by negligence of the railroad con1pany. It 
cannot fairly be said that the phraseology contained at the 
end of the quoted portion of the instruction is a qualification 
of the court's first statement therein contained to the effect 
that liability should be imposed upon the railroad by the 
jury upon proof of employn1ent, plus injury. 
We concede that in other instructions the court advised 
the jury that liability was based on negligence; but the very 
first mention of the law applicable to the matter of liability 
in this case was the following statement of the trial court: 
"The statute upon which this action is based is 
the Federal Employers Liability Act and said Act 
provides every common carrier by railroad while 
engaging in commerce between any of the several 
states shall be liable in damages to any person suf-
fering injury while he is employed by such carrier 
in such commerce." 
The vice of this instruction is more readily apparent 
when as in this case the defendant has admitted, (a) em-
ployment, (b) interstate commerce, and (c) injury. The 
error contained in this instruction was magnified by the 
arguments of counsel for the plaintiff who in this case, and 
habitually, refer to and discuss the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act in argument to the jury as a law holy in 
nature, akin to an 11th Commandment. No later instruc-
tion could erad~cate the erroneous impression which might 
have been derived by the jury from this instruction. :Cer-
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tainly, if other instructions ;which more aptly stat€ the 
principles of liability were read and understood by the jury, 
Instruction No. 3 must have appeared inconsistent there-
with, and it is now impossible for this court or counsel to 
state which of the conflicting instructions were actually 
followed by the jury. We therefore respectfully submit 
that a fair summary of the possible effect of Instruction 
No.3 on the jury is as follows: 
(1) The jury is told that liability may be 
found on the basis of employment, plus injury; 
(2) The jury is told, and it appears uncontra-
dicted, that these two facts have been substantiated; 
( 3) That the court failed to make a proper 
qualification of this statement in Instruction No. 3 
limiting such liability to injuries caused by negli-
gence of the railroad ; 
( 4) In other instructions the court told the 
jury that liability was based on negligence; and 
(5) That it is impossible to state which doc-
trine of liability was followed by the jury. 
There can be no dou]?t that this error alone requires 
reversal of the judgment in this case. 
Railroad carriers have a decreasingly smaller amount 
of protection from the courts under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act as to what may be found by a jury to be 
negligence (see Wilkerson case, supra) ; conversely it should 
be increasingly important that the jury be advised that 
proof of negligence is necessary to recovery lest the protec-
tection of jury trial, mentioned in the concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Black in the Wilkerson case, also be removed: 
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"This assumption, that railroads are made in-
surer where the issue of negligence is left to the 
jury, is inadmissible. It rests on another assump-
tion, this one inarticulate, that jurors will invariably 
decide negligence questions against railroads. This 
is contrary to fact as shown * * * by other 
F.E.L.A. cases * * *" 
If verdicts based on instructions of the type given by 
the trial court in Instruction No. 3 are pennitted to stand, 
then even the protection described by Mr. Justice Black 
will have been taken from defendants under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. 
In view Qf the recent United States Supreme Court 
opinions making practically any injured employe case under 
the F. E. L. A. a jury question as to negligence, it would 
seem that the very minimum of fair play and fireside 
justice which should be afforded the employer is an un-
mistakably clear instruction to the effect that liability 
should not be imposed in the absence of negligence. We do 
not believe that the defendant was afforded this right by 
a set of instructions containing an instruction such as the 
quoted portion of Instruction No. 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY IN A HYPOTHETICAL MANNER NOT 
BASED ON EVIDENCE BY ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
In the second paragraph of Instruction No.9 the court 
told the jury, in substance and effect, that it might not find 
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in attempting 
to operate the switch in question while suffering from a 
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muscular weakness in his abdomen due to the previous opera-
tion, if the plaintiff was operating and using the inside cross-
over switch at Milford, Utah, in the usual, ordinary and 
customary manner. What evidence given at the trial led the 
court to so instruct the jury we do not know. Plaintiff's Re-
quested Instruction No. 7 was given by the court as its 
Instruction No. 9, despite the fact that no evidence in the 
record indicated that plaintiff was operating the switch in 
the usual, ordinary and customary manner at the time of 
his injury, and despite the further· fact that the evidence 
of every witness who testified concerning the same is to 
the contrary. In the case of State Bank of Beaver County 
v. HoUingshead, 82 Ut. 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, the Utah 
Supreme Court condemned as error the giving of hypo-
thetical instructions not supported by evidence in the fol-
lowing language: 
"It is proper and generally necessary for the 
court in its instructions to submit to the jury the 
theory of the case as presented by the defendant as 
well as that presented by the plaintiff. It is neces-
sary, however, that whatever theories are presented 
by pleadings or otherwise, in order to be entitled 
to be submitted by way of instructions to the jury, 
some evidence must have been received by the court 
in support of such theory. * * * There is a com-
plete absence of anything in the evidence that would 
make the instruction applicable to the defendant, 
and yet the instruction is so worded and constructed 
that it is evident the jury could make just that 
application of it. We think the giving of this instruc-
tion referred to as 7 A was error. It is the duty of the 
court to instruct the jury as to the law applicable 
to the evidence of the particular case, having refer-
. ence to the parties thereto. The language as was 
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used might well have been employed in stating legal 
principles, but the litigants are entitled to have the 
law as declared applicable to the particular facts 
of the case as they affect the parties to which they 
refer." 
This case presents a square holding that instructions 
not based on evidence, no matter how accurate the principles 
of law therein contained may be, should not be given by the 
trial court. To the same effect see Smith v. Cannady, 45 
Ut. 521, 147 P. 210; Everts v. WorreU, 58 Ut. 238, 197 P. 
1043; and State v. Pa.rker, 104 Ut. 23, 137 P. (2d) 626, at 
page 632. These cases make it unmistakably clear that in-
structions with no foundation in the evidence are not to be 
given by a trial court. In the case at bar, as is equally clear, 
no evidence was offered by the plaintiff or by the defendant 
that the method of operation of the switch chosen by Duffy 
was the usual, ordinary and customary method. See the 
testimony of the witness Connell (R. 249, 250), and the 
testimony of the witness Robinson (R. 261). Consequently, 
there seems no justification for an instruction such as In-
struction No. 9, which invites the jury to disregard the 
unusual manner in which Duffy threw the switch as possible 
contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of the United 
States having made nearly any conduct a jury question on 
negligence, contributory negligence should be governed by 
the same loose principles, and the jury should have been 
permitted to find Duffy guilty of contributory negligence 
for throwing the switch in a distinctly unusual manner; but, 
in any event, it was clearly error to advise the jury that 
Duffy was not guilty of contri'butory negligence if he had 
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used the customary method when no evidence that the 
method chosen was the usual method had been received. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANT 
RAILROAD COMPANY WAS TO KEEP THE SWITCH 
IN SUGH WORKING CONDITION THAT AN INJURY 
WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO RESULT FROM OVER-
EXERTION TO ANY EMPLOYE THROWING SAID 
SWITCH. 
In the first paragraph of Instruction No. 11 the fol-
lowing principle of law was given to the jury by the trial 
court: 
"It was the duty of the defendant railroad com-
pany to keep this switch in such working condition 
that an injury would not be likely to .result from 
overexertion to any employe throwing said switch." 
The quoted portion of Instruction 11 informs the jury 
that the railroad company has an absolute duty to make the 
switch safe to any employee required to work the same, re-
gardless of the manner in which the employe may choose to 
operate the switch. We respectfully urge that such is not 
and never has been the law even under the F. E. L.A. The 
only purpose for giving the quoted portion of the instruction 
must have been to advise the jury of the railroad's duty 
as to the condition of the switch so that the jury would 
be in a position to decide whether the railroad was negli-
gent in that the duty had been breached. It therefore fol-
lows that this instruction is erroneous in at least two 
particulars : first, the quoted portion of Instruction No. 
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11 does not limit the railroad's duty to the exercise of 
reasonable care in keeping said switch in safe working 
condition. Mr. Justice Douglas in the case of Ba-iley v. 
Central Ve-rmont Railway, Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 87 L. Ed. 
1444, 63 Sup. Ct. 1062, defined the law under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act as follows : 
"At common law the duty of the employer to 
use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with 
a safe place to work was plain * * * that rule 
is deeply ingrained in federal jurisprudence * * * 
reasonable care becomes then a demand of higher 
supremacy, and yet in all cases it is a question of 
the reasonableness of the care * * * reason-
ableness depending upon the danger attending the 
place or the machinery * * * it is that ·rule 
which obtains under the Employers' Liability Act." 
Certainly this decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States makes it clear that the duty imposed upon 
the railroad is to exercise reasonable care to keep its ap-
pliances in safe condition rather than an absolute mandate 
that such appliances must be kept safe. In the case of 
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 87 L. 
Ed. 610, ·63 Sup. Ct. 444, Mr. Justice Black expressed the 
same proposition in the following language : 
"In this situation the employer's liability is to 
be determined under the general rule which defines 
negligence as the lack of due care under the circum-
stances; or the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent man would ordinarily have done under the 
circumstances of the situation; or doing what such 
a person under the existing circumstances would not 
have done." 
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See also the statement of Mr. Justice Black in the 
Wilkerson case, supra, as follows: 
"But the issue of negligence is one for juries to 
determine according to their finding of whether an 
employer's conduct measures up to what a reason-
able and prudent person would have done under the 
same circumstances." 
· The rule is not, therefore, that the railroad company 
must furnish a reasonably safe appliance, but rather, that 
the railroad company must use reasonable care to furnish 
a reasonably safe appliance. This doctrine found further 
expression in the case of Lmoden v. Hansen, 134 Fed. (2d) 
340. In that case the plaintiff was injured when a defective 
spring switchstand broke causing the plaintiff to fall to the 
ground and causing the upper part of the switchstand to 
fall on top of him. In passing upon liability, the Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
"The defendant was under the continuing duty 
of exercising ordinary care to see that the instru-
mentalities and appliances furnished for the use of 
plaintiff as well as the premises where he was re-
quired to work were maintained in a reasonably 
safe condition." 
In other words, the mere existence of a defect in the 
switch upon which Duffy was injured is not negligence; the 
negligence, if any there be, must be founded on conduct of 
the railroad permitting the existence of such defect which 
fglls short of the standard of reasonable care. 
The second vice of the quoted portion of the instruction 
is even more apparent and the error thereof is emphasized 
by the fact that defendant's Requested Instructions Nos. 9 
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and 10 advised the court of the defendant's position in this 
regard. The instruction completely fails to take into ac-
count the duty imposed upon the employe by the law to 
exercise reasonable care for his own safety. Certainly the 
law does not require of the defendant that it make the 
switch on which Duffy was injured accident-proof. All that 
is required is that the switch be placed in such condition as 
to be reasonably safe for an employe using the same with 
reasonable care for his own safety. In the case at bar the 
jury determined that Duffy was guilty of contributory negli-
gence and consequently determined that Duffy had failed 
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety in the manner 
in which he threw the switch. This factor demonstrates the 
weakness of the court's instruction since the jury might well 
have believed that the switch was safe for an employe ex-
ercising reasonable care for his own safety but that, never-
theless, the railroad company was liable since the switch 
had not been made safe for any employe using the saine. To 
illustrate this possibility we submit the following examples.: 
Assume that the switch on which Duffy was injured might 
have been in any one of the three following conditions : first, 
such condition that 50 units of energy were required of any 
employe throwing the same ; second, such condition that 
100 units of energy were required of any employe throwing 
the same; and third, such condition that 200 units of energy 
were required of any employe throwing the same. Assume 
further that a force of 200 units of energy required dan-
gerous exertion on the part of any switchman in the opinion 
of the jury; second, that a force of 100 units of energy re-
quired exertion which was only dangerous to a switchman 
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failing to exercise reasonable care for his own safety ; and 
third, that a force of 50 units of energy required exertion 
:which was safe as to any employe. We respectfully submit 
that the duty of the defendant was to exercise reasonable 
care to furnish a switch to its employes in the second of 
these conditions, i. e., a condition reasonably safe to said 
employe if the employe exercised reasonable care for his 
own safety. Consequently, while the duty of the railroad 
company in the abstract remains fixed at the standard 
denominated "reasonable care," nevertheless the railroad's 
duty as applied to the facts of this case in reference to the 
quantum of care required was dependent upon the conduct of 
the employe. The court's Instruction No. 11 failed to take 
this factor into account, despite the fact that defendant's 
Requested Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 asked that this proposi-
tion be submitted for the jury's determination. 
No evidence was introduced by either party hereto 
showing any defective mechanical condition of the switch; 
instead, all evidence of both parties was addressed to the 
difficulty of the operation of the switch. Such difficulty of 
operation is a relative thing since no one stated the exact 
amount of force required to throw the switch on the occasion 
·of plaintiff's injury or on any other occasion. Instruction 
No. 11 required the jury to find that the defendant had 
violated its duty and was consequently negligent, regardless 
of any consideration as to whether the employe throwing 
the switch had exercised reasonable care for his own safety. 
Such instruction imposed upon the defendant the absolute 
duty of making its switches or any other equipment ac-
Cident-proof. 
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The simplest piece of equipment improperly used may 
not be reasonably safe. A hammer used for pounding a nail 
may be dangerous if improperly used, but the. fact of im-
proper use does not make the hammer itself unreasonably 
dangerous. On a more complicated piece of equipment, such 
as the switch upon which Duffy suffered his injury, the 
condition of the equipment and the method of its use must 
always be interrelated, i. e., what will be reasonably safe 
equipment with one method of operation may be unsafe with 
another method. Since the court's Instruction No. 11 is in 
absolute contradiction to the foregoing principles, all of 
which are so well settled as to be beyond successful refuta-
tion, we submit that the defendant was deprived of its right 
to a trial by jury properly instructed. All that is left to 
defendants under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is 
the right to argue matters of this sort to a jury. From even 
this somewhat dubious advantage the defendant railroad 
was foreclosed by Instruction No. 11. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
PAIN AND SUFFERING TO BE SUSTAINED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF IN THE FUTURE AND FOR LOSS OF 
BODILY FUNCTTON TO BE SUSTAINED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF IN THE FUTURE. 
The court's Instruction No. 16, at lines 10, 11, 18 and 
. 20, permitted and invited the jury to award the plaintiff 
compensation for pain and suffering, both mental and 
physical, which he would probably endure in the future, 
and also for loss of bodily function which he would probably 
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suffer in the future. This instruction was given at the re-
quest of the plaintiff, despite the fact that not one word 
of evidence indicated any likelihood, probability or even 
possibility that such loss would be occasioned to the plain-
tiff. The only evidence in the whole record dealing with 
Duffy's probable future condition is contained in the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's witness, Dr. Rees Anderson. (See 
page 19'1 of the Record.) Not one word in all the evidence 
at the trial indicated that Duffy was suffering pain or that 
he had been suffering pain from his injuries for more than 
one year prior to the trial. Not one word of testimony in-
dicated that Duffy's bodily function had been impaired by 
his injuries or that it was probable or likely that his bodily 
function would be impaired by his injuries, and the evidence 
conclusively shows that for more than one year prior to the 
time of trial Duffy's earning capacity had not been affected 
to the slightest extent by any injury sustained in this ac-
cident. Nevertheless, in Instruction No. 16 the jury was 
permitted and invited to consider these elements of future 
damage in arriving at its verdict. Perhaps this erroneous 
instruction, induced by plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
No. 5, may be the reason for the outrageous verdict returned 
in this case; but whether this instruction be the explana-
tion of the size of the verdict rendered or not, there is no 
doubt but that the submission of said instruction constituted 
reversible error. 
Elements of damage which may be considered by a 
jury in arriving at its verdict are no different in principle 
than elements of negligence or other issues which may be 
considered by a jury. If the trial court had submitted to 
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the jury an instruction permitting the jury to find the 
defendant guilty of negligence by virtue of its failure to 
furnish adequate lighting at the scene of the accident, no 
one would seriously contend that such an instruction by the 
court was proper. This would be obvious because no evi-
dence was offered indicating any valid basis for the giving 
of such an instruction on negligence. The cases have plainly 
indicated that the same rule applies to elements of damage 
as would apply to the issue of negligence. In the case of 
Jensen v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry. Co., 257 N. W. 
257, the Supreme Court of Nebraska was faced with an 
identical situation in a personal injury case arising out of 
a fall. In the opinion on rehearing of that case, which a p-
pears as cited above, the court made the following obser-· 
vations: 
"Defendant complains of an instruction given by 
the court relative to the measure of damages to which 
plaintiff was entitled if recovery was awarded her. 
In the instruction it was said that if the jury found 
for plaintiff she should be awarded compensation 
for her pain and suffering endured 'and that it is 
reasonably established will in all probability be en-
dured by her as a result of her said injuries.' The 
rule applicable to future pain and suffering has been 
considered on several occasions by this court. 
"In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McDowell, 66 
Neb. 170, 92 N. W. 121, it was held: 'In an action 
for personal injuries, compensation can be recovered 
for only such future damages as are shown with reas-
onable certainty to be consequent thereupon.' 
"In Burkamp v. Roberts Sanitary Dairy, 117 
Neb. 60, 219 N. W. 805, a similar instruction to the 
one given was held to be erroneous. In that case 
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it was said (page 66 of 117 Neb., 219 N. W. 805, 
807) : 'This was error in so far as it permitted the 
jury to allow damages for pain which the plaintiff 
will 'probably suffer in the future'.' 
"The instruction complained of was prejudi-
cially erroneous in that it permitted the jury to award 
damages for future pain and suffering which may 
not have been proved with reasonable certainty." 
In the case of Missouri, Pac. Transportation Co. v. 
Kinney, 135 S. W. (2d) S6, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
considered the same problem with a similar result. In that 
case, which was a suit for personal injuries to the right arm 
of the plaintiff causing an injury to the ulnar nerve, the 
trial court had instructed the jury that plaintiff might re-
cover damages for "the physical pain and mental anguish 
suffered and endured by him in the past, if any, and that 
which he will endure in the future; the effect of the injury 
on his health ; pecuniary loss from his diminished capacity 
for earning money through life, if any." Upon consideration 
of this instruction the court made the following remarks: 
"Before such a recovery can be allowed, the per-
manency of the injury must be made to appear from 
the evidence with reasonable certainty and that 
future pain and suffering are inevitable and if they 
appear to be only probable or uncertain they cannot 
be taken into the estimate." 
That the evidence in the case at bar, far from indicat-
ing a reasonable certainty of future pain and suffering and 
of future loss of bodily function, instead is absolutely devoid 
of evidence even indicating a possibility thereof, is so clear 
that we herewith challenge counsel for the respondent to 
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point out any evidence which indicates even remotely the 
possibility of permanent injury sustained by Duffy. 
In the case of Putnam v. Unionville Granite Works, 
122 S. W. (2d) 389, the Supreme Court of Arkansas con-
sidered this problem and made the following comments: 
"Instruction No. 2 authorized the jury to take 
into consideration as bearing upon the measure of 
damages the question of permanent injuries. The 
positive evidence of the only medical witness, testify-
ing for plaintiff, was that his injuries are not per-
manent in their character. It was positive error to 
instruct on permanent injuries, for here the question 
does not rest on probability, possibility, or specula-
tion; it does not exist, having been definitely elimi-
nated by plaintiff's own medical evidence." 
To find a more direct statement covering the exact 
situation presented in the case at bar is difficult to conceive. 
In the Missouri case of Martin v. Springfield Water Co., 
128 S. W. (2d) 674, the court reaffirmed this proposition 
in the following language: 
"Complaint is made as to plaintiff's third in-
struction which instructs the jury as to permanent 
injury or future suffering of the plaintiff with com-
pensation therefor, when there was no evidence as 
to such issues. The plaintiff's own physician testi-
fied that there were no permanent injuries. * * * 
It was error under this testimony to instruct as to 
permanent injury." 
This proposition is in reality so obviously the law that 
no useful purpose would be served by further argument. 
Suffice it to say that the court's Instruction No. 16, given at 
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the request of the plaintiff, which uses the word "compen-
sation" or "compensate" no less than six times in what 
appears to be a calculated attempt to influence the jury to 
the·notion that the F. E. L.A. is a workmen's compensation 
act, clearly permitted the jury to award damages for 
elements of damage in no way substantiated by evidence. 
The verdict equal .to the prayer of the plaintiff's complaint 
having resulted, it appears unlikely that plaintiff will be 
able to successfully contend that the error was no~ pre-
judicial. 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS SO EXCESSIVE 
AS TO REQUIRE THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL 
IN THIS ACTION. 
By its verdict in this case the jury assessed damages 
sustained by the plaintiff in the sum of $12,500.00. It is true 
that the jury reduced the amount of the verdict by $3,500.00 
for contributory negligence of the plaintiff, but regardless 
of this reduction the fact remains that the damages assessed 
were $12,500.00. This is the only assumption justified be-
cause both parties are bound to assume that the jury fol-
lowed the court's instructions and performed its function 
in accordance with the instructions. (See ·the opinion of 
Mr. Justice Black in the Wilkerson case, supra). The evi-
dence further revealed, without any dispute, that plaintiff's 
total economic loss by reason of his injuries was $1,300.00. 
This was his stipulated loss of income. By its Instruction 
No. 16 the court told the jury that it might consider the 
following elements in arriving at the amount of damages 
to be awarded: 
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( 1) Pain and suffering, both mental and phys-
ical, which has been endured by the plaintiff and 
which he will probably endure in the future; 
( 2) Loss of bodily function which plaintiff 
has suffered or which plaintiff will probably suffer 
in the future; 
( 3) Loss of past earnings. 
Item No. 3 above being fixed in the sum of $1,300.00, $11,-
200.00 of the verdict in this case must be accounted for by 
items No. 1 and No. 2 above. As has heretofore been pointed 
out in this brief we are of the opinion that the court erron-
eously allowed the jury to consider future pain and suffer-
ing and future loss of bodily function, but even if these 
items were properly to be considered by the jury, never-
theless, in the absence of any evidence thereon, no appreci-
able portion of the verdict may properly be attributable to 
these factors. The remaining item which must in and of 
itself justify $11,200.00 of this verdict is the pain and 
suffering endured by Duffy as a result of the hernia and 
of the operation to correct the same. For the court's con-
venience in considering this matter we have heretofore in 
this brief set forth every word of testimony given by any 
witness for either the plaintiff or the defendant describ-
ing or discussing the pain and suffering sustained by Duffy. 
We respectfully submit that if any reasonable person were 
asked to compare this ordeal with the normal affairs which 
a common person sustains in his every day life he could not 
but conclude that the pain and suffering so expressively 
stated by Mr. Duffy was no greater than that occasioned 
to any person on the removal of an appendix and not much, 
if any, more serious than an ordinary tonsilectomy. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has heretofore made clear 
the function of the Supreme Court of this State in passing 
upon the size of verdicts. In the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, 
in the opinion written by the court on mandate from the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 109 Ut. 431, 184 P. (2d) 
123, this court carefully considered previous Utah cases and 
laid down the following rule : 
"Some of the early cases recognized, at least 
impliedly, that the trial judge might order a remis-
sion from an excessive verdict. Kennedy et al. v. 
Oregon Short LineR. Co., supra; Nelson v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad 'Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 P. 644. But 
from the language used in these and other decisions 
a view developed that this court was powerless to 
interfere with a jury verdict, no matter how outrag-
eous. This view was exploded in the case of Jensen 
v. Denber & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 
1192, where, after citing with approval many of 
the cases above cited, we said: 
"'Still the jury cannot be permitted to go un-
bridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new 
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be granted 
by the court below on the ground of 'excessive dam-
ages appearing to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice.' Whenever that is 
made to appear, the court, when its action is prop-
erly invoked, should require a remission or set the 
verdict aside and grant a new trial. But, before the 
court is justified to do that, it should clearly be made 
to appear that the jury totally mistook or disregarded 
the rules of law by which the damages were to be 
regulated, or wholly misconceived or disregarded all 
the evidence, and by so doing committed gross and 
palpable error by rendering a verdict so enormous 
or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to nei-
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ther the charge nor the evidence, but only to passion 
or prejudice. Whether a new trial should or should 
not be granted on this ground, of necessity, must 
largely rest within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. 
"'Still that court, in such particular, is not 
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may nevertheless 
be inquired into and reviewed on an alleged abuse of 
discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary exercise of 
power in such respect. Such a review is not review 
of a question of fact, but of law * * * our pow-
er to correct a plain abuse of discretion or undo a 
mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of power can-
not be doubted. 
"'We have said this much, in view of plaintiff's 
contention and of opinions heretofore somewhat 
loosely expressed at the bar, that in a case of tort 
tried to a jury, no matter how enormous or flagrantly 
outrageous a verdict may be, the trial court alone 
is authorized to grant relief; and though that court 
may, by a clear abuse of discretion, and by an arbi-
trary exercise of power, have gone as wild as did 
the jury and suffered an outrageous and unjust ver-
dict to stand, or on mere whimsical and capricious 
grounds set a verdict aside amply supported by com-
petent evidence, yet we are powerless to interfere. 
We do not so understand the prior decisions. In all 
of them where it was said this court is not authorized 
to review a question of excessive damages, such 
question being one of fact, the statements are quali-
fied, except to ascertain 'if there is any evidence to 
support the verdict,' 'except so far as may be neces-
sary to determine questions of law.' We reaffirm 
that. And since an assignment based on a ruling 
alleged to have been made by an abuse of discretion 
or by a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of 
power, in granting or refusing a new trial, presents 
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a question of law, not of fact, we may as such review 
it.' 
"Since the Jensen case above quoted, it is well 
settled that this court has power to, and will, con-
sider assignments of error based on excessive ver-
dicts. 
* * * 
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice, and the trial court abused its discretion or 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion 
for new trial, we may order the verdict set aside and 
a new trial granted. Jensen v. Denver & R. G. Co., 
supra; and other ·cases cited above following that 
decision." 
In view of this analyzation of the principles it does not 
appear necessary to cite the cases upon which the Pauly case 
was based. We do, however, wish to call to the court's at-
tention the case of McAfee v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot 
Company, 6'2 Utah 115, 218 P. 98, wherein the court stated: 
"We now take occasion to say that verdicts will 
not be interfered with by this court on account of 
being excessive unless the facts are such that the 
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or that 
the verdict is so excessive as to be shocking to one's 
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice 
or corruption on the part of the jury. When a ver-
dict is so excessive that it clearly indicates passion 
and prejudice, a new trial should be granted uncon-
ditionally. 
* * * 
"Verdicts rendered 10, 15 or 20 years ago are 
of little help in determining what amount is now 
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excessive in a personal injury case. The present cost 
of living must be considered, and the diminished 
purchasing power of the dollar must be taken into 
consideration when estimating damages. In Coke 
v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624, it is said: 
"'A few years ago such a sum might not have 
been awarded by a jury, but in this day of high prices 
the amount awarded cannot be said to be excessive.'" 
The remarks above quoted with reference to the small 
consequence to be attached to verdicts of 10, 15 or 20 years 
ago are particularly appropriate in the present day when 
money admittedly has less purchasing power than at other 
occasions in the history of our State. It is, therefore, ob-
viously a useless thing to cite to this court cases holding 
particular verdicts to be excessive. Each case must stand 
upon its own facts in light of the situation of its own time, 
but granting that money is cheap today and that judgments 
and verdicts for increasingly larger amounts are daily being 
sustained as proper, nevertheless, we are unable to bring 
ourselves to believe that the Supreme Court of this State 
will affirm an award of $11,200.00 for the pain and suffer-
ing of resewing an incisional hernia. If we are in error in 
this belief then our courts will have reached a new zenith in 
sustaining the excessess of our modern juries. No case with 
which we are familiar in any jurisdiction in the United 
States has ever sustained such an award as this for the 
relatively minor nature of Mr. Duffy's injuries and we are 
unwilling to believe that the power of the Supreme Court of 
this State for the prevention of injustice is so weak and 
feeble a thing that it cannot correct a verdict so exorbitant 
as the one in the case at bar. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
As to the proper procedure to be adopted by this court 
in correcting the obvious error of the trial court in denying 
defendant's motion for new trial, there are, of course, two 
possibilities. The first method would be by declaring the 
verdict to be so excessive as to indicate that the jury was 
influenced by passion and prejudice, which might have sub-
stantially affected its deliberations on other issues in the 
case, so that an outright grant of a new trial to the defend-
ant would be required. (See the McAfee case, supra.) The 
second method would be to require the plaintiff to remit 
a portion of the judgment as was done in the case of 
Shepard v. Payne~ 60 Ut. 140, 206 P. 1098. 
It should not be necessary for this court to determine 
which of these alternatives ought to 'be followed because a 
new trial should be granted on the basis of the numerous 
other errors discussed in this brief; but should the court 
conclude that the defendanVs position on the other errors 
assigned is not well taken, then this court would be faced-
with a choice between the two alternatives outlined. The 
principle which must guide the court in its choice between 
these alternatives has heretofore been indicated by the 
opinions above cited. That principle may be briefly stated 
as follows : "If the verdict is so grossly excessive and dis-
proportionate to the injury that from its size alone it ap-
.pears to have been arrived at by passion or prejudice, then 
the proper remedy is by the granting of a new trial." If 
the verdict is not excessive to that degree but only to such 
degree that it appears the jury misunderstood the instruc-
tions or the evidence on damages, then remittitur of a por-
tion of the verdict by the plaintiff should be required. 
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It seems to us that no useful purpose could be served 
by discussing this matter further than to say that $11,200.00 
for the pain and suffering described in the evidence appears 
to us, at least, to be so excessive as to require a new trial. 
Large verdicts for loss of arms, legs, eyes, or for the death 
of husbands and fathers may often be explained by the 
natural sympathetic feelings which any normal person has 
toward a maimed individual or a widow and minor children; 
but the verdict in this case is so disproportionate that we 
frankly state to the court that we are unable to conceive of 
any feeling on the part of the jury which would justify the 
same, except a desire of the majority of the members of the 
jury to "pour it on" a large corporation as punishment for 
the terrible sin of the defendant railroad company in giving 
Mr. Duffy a high paying job. If this court agrees with us 
that the excessiveness is of this nature, then our motion for 
a new trial should have been granted and the trial court's 
error in that regard should be corrected by now granting 
defendant a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary of our position in connection with this 
action we state to the court that the defendant was deprived 
of a fair trial under the law by the court's instructions and 
by the passion and prejudice of the jury against a large 
corporation. We contend and urge first, that the trial 
court instructed the jury that the defendant was absolutely 
liable for Duffy's injuries, contrary to law; second, that 
the court permitted the jury to award damages for elements 
of damage not justified by any evidence; third, that the trial 
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court erroneously advised the jury as to the duties imposed 
by the law upon the railroad company in the exercise of due 
care for the safety of its employes; and fourth, that when 
the jury, through passion and prejudice at worst or ignor-
ance at best, rendered a verdict so excessive as to shock the 
conscience of any reasonable person, the trial court never-
theless denied defendant's motion for a new trial and re-
fused even to reduce the verdict as a condition to the denial 
of said motion. Any one of these errors standing alone 
should justify the granting of a new trial, but in combina-
tion the cumulative effect thereof worked such a palpable 
injustice as to require that the judgment be set aside and 
a new trial granted on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
of Counsel 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
April 16·, 1949 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
Counsel for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
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